We introduce a uniform distance semantics for different paradigms that require nonmonotonic and paraconsistent reasoning, among which are mediators of independent data-sources, integrators of prioritized knowledge-bases, operators for iterated belief revision, and analytic tools of decision support systems. We show that the consequence relations that are induced by our framework share some desirable properties and demonstrate this by relevant applications.
INTRODUCTION
Many realistic decision aid problems are fraught with facets of ambiguity, anomalies and conflicts. This commands the incorporation of declarative means for expressing how to reason in various contexts involving decision or choice. Classical logic, the most advocated formalism for reasoning with mathematical theories, is not useful for this task as, for instance, any conclusion classically follows from an inconsistent set of assumptions. Additionally, by its definition, classical logic is monotonic, while human thinking is non-monotonic in nature, that is, the set of conclusions is not necessarily non-decreasing in the size of the premises.
Distance semantics is a subtle way of handling dynamically evolving and possibly contradictory information, as it provides quantitative means for drawing 'rational' conclusions form a given set of assumptions. Indeed, reasoning with distance semantics is a cornerstone behind many formalisms for maintaining uncertainty, such as operators for modelling belief revision (e.g., [7, 16, 18, 24, 29] ), methodologies for merging independent datasources [20, 21, 25] , consistent query answering in database systems [1, 3, 4, 9, 10, 26] , and several areas in the context of social choice theory, such as group decision making [22] , preference representation [23] , and judgment aggregation [17, 27] .
The goal of this paper is to introduce a uniform framework for the above paradigms and many other formalisms that are based on distance semantics. For this, we define a possible-world semantics, derived by distance considerations, and consider different metrics on the universe (i.e., all the possible worlds). Each metric induces a different consequence relation for reasoning with the underlying information.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: in the next section we introduce the framework and the family of distance-based entailments that it induces. In that section we also show some basic properties of the distance entailments. In Section 3 we consider situations in which the available data is prioritized, and extend the definition of the distance-based entailments accordingly. In Section 4 we demonstrate the applicative potential of our framework and in Section 5 we conclude.
pretations, reasoning with a given set of premises Γ is based on those interpretations that are 'dclosest' to Γ (called the most plausible interpretations of Γ). This set of interpretations determine the Γ-conclusions, which means that, unlike classical logic, our formalisms are non-monotonic and do not become trivial in the presence of contradictions. For instance, it is intuitively clear that interpretations in which q is true should be closer to Γ = {p, ¬p, q} than interpretations in which q is false, and so q should follow from Γ while ¬q should not follow from Γ, although Γ is not consistent. In what follows we formalize this idea.
PRELIMINARIES
In the sequel, we consider finite sets of premises (theories) in a propositional language L with a finite set Atoms of atomic formulas. We denote by Λ the space of the two-valued interpretations on Atoms. The set of atomic formulas that occur in the formulas of a theory Γ is denoted Atoms(Γ), and the set of models of Γ (that is, the interpretations ν ∈ Λ such that ν(ψ) = t for every ψ ∈ Γ) is denoted mod(Γ).
Example 2 It is easy to verify that the following two functions are distances on Λ.
• The drastic distance:
• The Hamming distance:
Definition 3 A numeric aggregation function f is a total function that accepts a multiset of real numbers and returns a real number. In addition, f is non-decreasing in the values of its argument,
is the number of atoms p such that ν(p) = µ(p). This function is also known as the Dalal distance [12] .
2 That is, the function value is non-decreasing when an element in the multiset is replaced by a larger element.
f ({x 1 , . . . , x n }) = 0 iff x 1 = . . . = x n = 0, and
The aggregation function in Definition 3 may be, e.g., a summation or the average of the distances, the maximum value among those distances (which yields a worst case analysis), a median value (for mean case analysis), and so forth. Such functions are common in data integration systems (see, e.g., Section 4).
Definition 4
Given a theory Γ = {ψ 1 , . . . , ψ n }, an interpretation ν ∈ Λ, a pseudo-distance d on Λ, and an aggregation function f , define:
Definition 5 A (pseudo) distance d is unbiased , if for every formula ψ and every two-valued in-
The last property assures that a distance between an interpretation and a formula depends only on the atoms that appear in the formula, and so it is not 'biased' by irrelevant atoms. Note, e.g., that the distances in Example 2 are unbiased.
The next definition captures the intuition behind distance semantics that the relevant interpretations of a theory Γ are those ones that are δ d,fclosest to Γ.
Definition 6
The most plausible valuations of Γ (with respect to a pseudo distance d and an aggregation function f ) are the interpretations ν ∈ Λ that belong to the following set:
Corresponding consequence relations are now defined as follows.
Definition 7 For a pseudo distance d and an ag
. That is, conclusions should follow from all the most plausible valuations of the premises.
Example 8 Let Γ = {p, q, r, ¬p ∨ ¬q, r ∧ s}. This theory is not consistent, and so everything classically follows from it, including, e.g., ¬r, which seems to be a very strange conclusion in this case.
3
Using distance-based semantics, this anomaly can be lifted. The following table lists the distances between the relevant valuations and Γ according to several common metrics: f f f f 4 5 2
As intuitively expected, s behaves similarly. Note also that the atoms p, q that are involved in the inconsistency are not deducible from Γ, nor their complements. The entailment |= d H ,max is more cautious; it does not allow to infer neither ¬r (as expected) nor r, but the weaker conclusion r ∨ s is deducible.
BASIC PROPERTIES OF
|= d,f
Paraconsistency
Paraconsistent logics [11, 28] are formalisms that tolerate inconsistency and do not become trivial in the presence of contradictions. As human knowledge and thinking necessarily requires inconsistency, conflicting data is unavoidable in practice, but (unlike the case of classical logic) this should not block the ability to draw 'rational' conclusions from contradictory theories. For instance, in Example 8, although Γ is not consistent, there is no reason to infer ¬r from it.
Proposition 9 For every pseudo distance d and aggregation function f , |= d,f is paraconsistent.
Proof. By the fact that for every Γ, ∆ d,f (Γ) = ∅ (as the minimal δ d,f -distance from Γ over a finite space of interpretations is always obtained). Thus, for every formula ψ such that there exists a valu-
Unbiasedness of the distance function allows us to strengthen Proposition 9, as in this case a formula never follows from a theory unless they share propositional atoms.
Proposition 10 Let d be an unbiased pseudo distance and f an aggregation function. For every theory Γ and a non-tautological formula ψ in L such that Atoms(Γ)∩Atoms({ψ}) = ∅, it holds that
If ν(ψ) = f we are done. Otherwise, consider a valuation µ that is the same as ν on Atoms(Γ) and µ(ψ) = f. Such a valuation exists since ψ is not a tautology, the value of µ(ψ) depends only on the assignments of µ on Atoms({ψ}), and
On the other hand, when the set of premises is consistent, there is no reason to draw conclusions that are different from those of standard classical logic. The following propositions show that this is exactly the situations in our framework:
Proposition 11 Let d be a pseudo distance and f an aggregation function. For every consistent Γ,
Proof. Let Γ = {ψ 1 , . . . , ψ n }. If ν is a model of Γ, then d(ν, ψ i ) = 0 for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and so δ d,f (ν, Γ) = 0 as well. Now, since for every valua-
For the converse, suppose that ν ∈ mod(Γ). Then ν does not satisfy ψ j for some 1 ≤ j ≤ n, and so d(ν, ψ j ) > 0. By Definition 3, f is strictly positive whenever it has at least one strictly positive argument and the other arguments are non-negative. We have, then, that δ d,f (ν, Γ) > 0. On the other hand, as mod(Γ) = ∅, there is a model µ of Γ, for which
Corollary 12 Denote by |= the standard entailment of classical logic. For every classically consistent set of formulas Γ and formula ψ, Γ |= ψ iff Γ |= d,f ψ.
By Proposition 9 and Corollary 12 we have, therefore, the following desirable property:
Corollary 13 Let d be an unbiased pseudo distance and f an aggregation function. Then |= d,f is the same as the classical entailment for consistent premises and is non-trivial otherwise.
Nonmonotonicity
Another characteristic property of |= d,f is its nonmonotonic nature, which implies that conclusions may be retracted in light of new information. In Example 8, for instance, we have that for
it is easy to check that Γ, ¬r |= d,Σ r. As the following proposition shows, this is not a coincidence.
Proposition 14
For every unbiased pseudo distance d and aggregation function f , |= d,f is nonmonotonic.
Adaptivity
Ataptivity, due to Batens [5, 6] , is the ability to handle contradictory theories in a nontrivial way and at the same time to presuppose the consistency of all the formulas 'unless and until proven otherwise'. Consequence relations with this property adapt to the specific inconsistencies that occur in the theories.
Example 15 The Disjunctive Syllogism should not be applied for concluding q from {p, ¬p, ¬p∨q}. On the other hand, in the case of {p, ¬p, r, ¬r ∨ q}, applying the Disjunctive Syllogism to r and ¬r ∨ q may be justified by the fact that the subset of formulas to which the Disjunctive Syllogism is applied is not affected by the inconsistency of the whole theory, therefore inference rules that are classically valid can be applied to it.
The next proposition shows that for hereditary aggregation functions (see Definition 16 below) |= d,f is adaptive: if a given theory can be split up to a consistent and an inconsistent parts, then every assertion that is not related to the inconsistent part, and which classically follows from the consistent part, is entailed by the whole theory.
Definition 16 An aggregation function f is called hereditary, if whenever f ({x 1 , . . . , x n }) < f ({y 1 , . . . , y n }), also f ({x 1 , . . . , x n , z 1 , . . . , z m }) < f ({y 1 , . . . , y n , z 1 , . . . , z m }).
4
Proposition 17 Let d be an unbiased pseudo distance and f a hereditary aggregation function. Suppose that Γ is a theory that can be represented as Γ ∪ Γ , where Γ is a classically consistent theory and Atoms(Γ ) ∩ Atoms(Γ ) = ∅. Then for every formula ψ such that Atoms(ψ)∩Atoms(Γ ) = ∅, it holds that if Γ |= ψ then Γ |= d,f ψ.
Proof . We first show the following lemma:
Lemma 17-A. Let d be a non-biased pseudo distance and f a hereditary aggregation function. If
Indeed, let Γ = {ψ 1 , . . . , ψ n }. If ψ is a tautology the lemma trivially holds. Otherwise, let µ be a valuation such that µ(ψ) = f. As Γ |= d,f ψ, necessarily µ / ∈ ∆ d,f (Γ), and so there is a ν ∈ ∆ d,f (Γ) for which d f (ν, Γ) < d f (µ, Γ). In oder words,
Again, since Γ |= d,f ψ, ν(ψ) = t. Now, consider a valuation σ, defined for every atom p as follows:
Note that σ(p) = ν(p) for all p ∈ Atoms(ψ), thus σ(ψ) = t. Now, as Atoms(Γ ∪ {ψ}) ∩ Atoms(φ) = ∅, d is non-biased, and f is hereditary, we have that
Thus, for every valuation µ such that µ(ψ) = f there is a valuation σ such that σ(ψ) = t and 
PRIORITIZED THEORIES
We now extend the distance-based semantics considered above to prioritized theories. Reasoning with prioritized information is very frequent in everyday life, and it is a cornerstone of many paradigms of knowledge representation and reasoning, such as annotated logic [30] and possibilistic logic [15] . Moreover, in many cases the nature of the underlying data dictates preferences. This is the case, for instance, in iterated belief revision [13, 14, 19] , where more recent data is considered more accurate and so it is preferred over older one, in database systems, where integrity constraints have higher precedence over database facts, and in consistency restoration of ranked knowledge-bases [2, 8] , where pieces of information may come from different sources with different reliability. In what follows we introduce a unifying distance-based approach for defining the underlying semantics of such systems.
Definition 19
An n-prioritized theory is a set Γ n of formulas in L, partitioned into n ≥ 1 pairwise disjoint sub-theories Γ i (1 ≤ i ≤ n). We denote this by
In what follows we shall usually write Γ instead of Γ n . Intuitively, formulas in higher levels of Γ are of higher priority than those in lower levels. That is, if 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n, then every formula in Γ j is preferred over the formulas in Γ i . 5 Next we formalize this intuition by a distance semantics.
Definition 20 Let d be a pseudo distance and f an aggregation function. For an n-prioritized theory Γ = Γ 1 ⊕ Γ 2 ⊕ . . . ⊕ Γ n consider the following n sets of interpretations:
is clearly nonincreasing, as sets with smaller indices are subsets of those with higher indices. This reflects the intuitive idea that higher levelled formulas are preferred over lower levelled formulas, thus the interpretations of the latter are determined by the interpretations of the former. 
Example 22 Consider the following three-leveled theory:
Then:
Clearly, Definition 21 is a conservative extension of Definition 7:
Definition 24 Let Γ be an n-prioritized theory. For any 1 ≤ i ≤ n, denote by Γ ≥i the n − i + 1 highest levels of Γ, that is:
The consistency level con of Γ is the minimal value i ≤ n such that Γ i ∪. . .∪Γ n is consistent. If there is no such value, let con = n+1 (and then Γ ≥con = ∅).
The following proposition is the analogue, for the prioritized case, of Proposition 11.
Proposition 25 Let d be a pseudo distance and f an aggregation function. For every nprioritized theory Γ with a consistency level con,
Proof. The proof is obtained by a simple accommodation to the prioritized case of the proof of Proposition 11.
Some relations to the entailment |= of classical logic are listed below:
Proposition 26 Let d be a pseudo distance and f an aggregation function. For every n-prioritized theory Γ with a consistency level con, we have that
Proof. The first part of the proposition is a clear consequence of Proposition 25. For the second part, note that the definition of
, and so ∆ d,f (Γ) ⊆ mod(Γ ≥con ). Now, if Γ ≥con |= ψ, then ψ is true in every element of mod(Γ ≥con ), which implies that ψ must be true in every element of
The last part holds since if Γ is consistent, i.e., con = 1, then by Proposition 25
If Γ is not consistent, then the claim trivially holds, since for every formula ψ, Γ |= ψ.
Note also, that although |= d,f is non-monotonic, we have, by items 1 and 2 of Proposition 26, that Γ ≥con |= d,f ψ implies that Γ |= d,f ψ. 7 
APPLICATIONS
As noted above, distance semantics is in the heart of different disciplines involving knowledge representation and reasoning. Below, we demonstrate the application potential of our framework in the context of merging and analyzing constraint data sources. In this case we have several theories (each one corresponds to a different source) that may have different priorities. That is, the underlying n-prioritized theory is now of the form Γ = {T Example 28 Consider the following scenario (borrowed from [21] ) regarding speculations on the stock exchange: Suppose that an investor (represented by the mediator system) consults four financial experts about their opinion regarding four different shares, denoted s 1 , s 2 , s 3 and s 4 . The opinion of expert i is represented by the theory (data-source) T i : T 1 = T 2 = {s 1 , s 2 , s 3 }, T 3 = {¬s 1 , ¬s 2 , ¬s 3 , ¬s 4 }, T 4 = {s 1 , s 2 , ¬s 4 }.
For instance, in our case expert 4 suggests to buy shares s 1 and s 2 , doesn't recommend to buy share s 4 , and doesn't have a particular opinion about s 3 .
In addition, the investor may have further restrictions about his or her investments. For instance, if some share, say s 4 , is considered risky, buying it may be balanced by purchasing at least two out of the three other shares and vice-versa. This policy may be represented by the following integrity constraint:
and explored the main logical properties of the corresponding consequence relations. It is shown that the entailments induced by distance semantics sustain different aspects of human thinking, such as non-monotonicity, paraconsistency, and adaptivity, and are useful for handling incomplete, inconsistent, and prioritized information.
